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1. Introduction
Due to significant advances in wireless and mobile communication techniques and the broad
development of potential applications, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have attracted great
attention in recent years. Nevertheless, WSNs are formed dynamically by a number of power-
limited sensor nodes and themanager nodewith long-lasting power. WSNs are self-organized
and autonomous systems consisting of common sensors, manager nodes and back-end data
center. Firstly, the common sensors are responsible for transmitting the real-time sensor data
of specific monitoring environment to the intermediate collection nodes called manager node.
Finally, the back-end data center will receive the sensed data from manager nodes to do fur-
ther process and analysis. Undoubtedly, all communication between nodes are through the
wireless transmission techniques. Furthermore, due to the property of self-organized, with-
out support from the fixed infrastructure and the topology of wireless sensor network changes
dynamically, therefore, broadcasting is the general way for communications in WSNs.
Wireless sensor network has been widely used in practical applications, such as monitoring of
forest fire, detection of military purpose, medical or science areas and even in our home life.
However, WSNs are easily compromised by attackers due to wireless communications use a
broadcast transmissionmedium and their lack of tamper resistance. Therefore, an attacker can
eavesdrop on all traffic, inject malicious packets, replay older messages, or compromise a sen-
sor node. Generally, sensor nodes are most worried about two major security issues, which
are privacy preserving and node authentication. Privacy means the data confidentiality is
achieved under security mechanism, and hence it allows network communications between
sensor nodes and the manager station to proceed securely. In addition, a well-structured au-
thentication mechanism can ensure that no unauthorized node is able to fraudulently par-
ticipate and get sensitive information from WSNs. As a result, several schemes have been
proposed to secure communications in WSNs. In this chapter, we classify them into three
classifications based on the cryptographic techniques: symmetric keys, asymmetric keys and
one-way hashing functions.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the characteristics
and consideration of WSNs. In Section 3, we review some security threats and requirements
in WSNs. Section 4 is for the security countermeasure schemes and its classification. Finally,
we conclude some future works for the secure networking in WSNs.
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2. Wireless Sensor Network
Compared with the traditional communication networks, some characteristics and considera-
tions for wireless sensor networks are discussed and addressed in the design of WSNs. These
are briefly reviewed in this section.
2.1 Characteristics of Wireless Sensor Network
• Non-centralized architecture: In WSNs, the status of every node is identical and no
one is responsible for providing normal services. It is lack of a central administration
and every node can join or disjoin the network any time. Besides, it does not affect
the whole sensor network if some node failed and is reliable for applications with high
stable requirement.
• Self-organized: Because WSNs are characterized as infrastructure-less networks and
lack of fixed infrastructure. Thus, the sensor network is fully constructed by themselves
when it is begin working with some pre-defined layering protocols and distributed al-
gorithms. Once sensor networks are constructed completely, the sensor data would be
collect and send to back-end system for further processing through the networks they
built.
• Multi-hop routing: The sensor range of nodes in the WSNs is assumed to be limited,
so if a node A would like to communicate with node D, which is out of communica-
tion range of node A. The node B would be a intermediate node and is responsible for
transmitting the communication data to each other between node A and node B. The
multi-hops is illustrated as Figure 1.
• Dynamic topology: In most of sensor network architecture assume that sensor nodes
are deployed randomly and the network topology would be changed dynamically since
the sensor node might be shut down, crash, recovery or utilize mobile sensors.
2.2 Consideration of Wireless Sensor Networks
• Hardware constraints: This part is related to physical property and many constraints
on these areas have been proposed. For example, limited energy. In addition, due to the
influence of limited volume of the sensor, some sensor can only provide limited storage,
limited bandwidth, limited energy and limited computation ability.
• Communication: The existing communicating schemes show that there are three main
types of communications in WSNs; including direct, clustering-based, and multi-hops
communication. In direct communication, every sensor node transmits its sensor data
to amanager node and themanager node is responsible for collecting these data to back-
end data center for further processing. In clustering communication, all sensor nodes
are divided into several groups and each cluster head node is responsible for collecting
data within its group. Multi-hops communication is used because the communication
range of a sensor is assumed to be limited and the neighboring sensor nodes maybe
used for transmitting the communication packets to each other on their path between
the source node and the destination node.
• Scalability: Another consideration is the scalability of sensor networks. In this case,
networking must keep on working whatever the number of sensor nodes are placed
will not be affected.
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• Fault tolerance: Due to the influence of applied environment on sensors, many excep-
tions have been addressed in sensor networks. For example, sensors may crash, power
failure or shut down etc. Such problems need to be avoided by the strategies of fault
tolerance to keep on networking.
• Power saving: When the sensors are distributed to monitor some environments of in-
terest, these sensors may work over a long span of several weeks even for months.
Therefore, how to provide a mechanism of power saving to extend its lifespan is highly
important. In general, there’s too great a consumption of power during the transmitting
message phase.
• Cost: Depending on the application of sensor network, a large number sensors might
be scattered randomly over an environment, such as weather monitoring. If the overall
cost was appropriate for sensor networks and it will be more acceptable and successful
to users which need careful consideration.
• Mobility: In clustered (hierarchical) WSNs, sensor nodes are typically organized into
many clusters, with cluster controllers collecting sense data from ordinary sensor nodes
in the managed cluster to the back-end data center. Furthermore, compared to mobile
ad hoc networks, when sensor nodes are randomly deployed in a designated area, they
only infrequently move from one cluster to another, and thus mobility is not a critical
issue in WSNs.
• Sleep pattern: The sleep pattern is highly necessary in WSNs to extend the availability
of the networks. For example, the manager node can set fresh bootstrapping times for
live sensors while other sensor nodes can shut down to save power. Different sensor
nodes are operated according to the bootstrapping times to which they belong and the
lifetime of WSNs is therefore extended in a differentiated way (23).
• Security: One of the challenges in WSNs is to provide high-security requirements with
constrained resources. The security requirements in WSNs are comprised of node au-
thentication, data confidentiality, anti-compromise and resilience against traffic anal-
ysis. To identify both trustworthy and unreliable nodes from a security standpoints,
the deployment sensors must pass an node authentication examination by their corre-
sponding manager nodes or cluster heads and unauthorized nodes can be isolated from
WSNs during the node authentication procedure. Similarly, all the packets transmitted
between a sensor and the manager node must be kept secret so that eavesdroppers can-
not intercept, modify and analyze, and discover valuable information in WSNs.
3. Security Threats and Requirements in Wireless Sensor Networks
In addition to the characteristics and considerations mentioned above, security threats and re-
quirements are also critical for a variety of sensor network applications. In recent years, there
are several security issues in WSNs have been proposed. In this section, we will introduce
some security threats and requirements in WSNs.
1. Passive attacks : In passive attacks (such as eavesdropping attacks), eavesdroppers can un-
intrusively monitor on the communication channel between two communicating nodes
to collect and discover valuable information without disturbing the communication (22;
24; 25).
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2. Active attacks : active attacks (such as node replication attacks, sybil attacks, wormhole at-
tacks, and compromised node attacks) can be further classified into two categories: ex-
ternal attacks and internal attacks. In external attacks (such as sybil attacks and worm-
hole attacks), a node does not belong to a sensor network and it can first eavesdrop on
packets sent or received by normal participating nodes for the eventual purpose of ma-
licious tempering, interfering, guessing, or spamming, and then injects invalid packets
to disrupt the network functionalities.
• For sybil attacks, a sensor node can illegitimately claim multiple IDs by either di-
rectly forging false IDs, or else impersonating legal IDs. This harmful attack may
lead to serious threats to distributed storage, routing algorithm and data aggrega-
tion.
• For wormhole attacks, the malicious node may be located within transmission
range of legitimate nodes while legitimate nodes are not themselves within trans-
mission range of each other. Thus, the malicious node can tunnel control traffic
between legitimate nodes and nonexistent links which in fact are controlled by the
malicious node. Finally, the malicious node can drop tunnelled packet or carry out
attacks on routing protocols.
Internal attacks (such as node replication attacks and node compromised attacks) are
usually caused by compromised members who are belong to the sensor network in
question, and hence internal attacks aremore difficult to safeguard against than external
attacks.
• For node replication attacks, when a sensor node is compromised by attackers,
they can directly place many replicas of this compromised node at different ar-
eas within the networks. Thus, attackers may use these compromised nodes to
subvert the network functionalities, for example by injecting false sense data.
• For compromised attacks, due to the lack of tamper resistance in sensor nodes, at-
tackers may compromise a sensor node and use it to establish communication
channels with non-compromised sensors to launch other more serious attacks
within the sensor network.
According to the above description of the security threats, we can infer that a secure sensor
network corresponds with the following requirements.
1. Node authentication : For this requirement, a deployed sensor node proves its validity to
its neighboring sensors and the manger node. Thus, an invalid outsider would be un-
able to send malevolent data into the networks and the manager node can confirm that
received sensed data has come from a valid sensor node, not from malicious outsiders.
This also implies that a sensor node joined in WSNs has been authenticated and it has
the right to access the sensor network.
2. Availability : The availability of the network should not be affected even if sensors can
only provide limited storage, limited power, and limited computational ability. There-
fore, a mechanism regulating of sleep patterns is necessary for a sensor to extend its
lifetime.
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3. Location awareness : The damage cannot be spread from the victimized area to the entire
network by security attacks even if the sensor node is compromised. A secure commu-
nication scheme must limit the damage’s scope caused by the intruders; the mechanism
of location awareness is used for this purpose.
4. Key establishment For sensor-to-sensor key establishment, a shared key is established by
two communication nodes to protect communications. Thus, all sensed data transmit-
ted between participants could be verified and protected even if an attacker eavesdrops
on the communications between nodes or injects illegal sensed data into networks, this
requirement still provides an adequate level of security.
5. No verification table : The verification tables are not required to be stored inside the man-
ager nodes to prevent stolen-verifier attacks.
6. Confidentiality : Path-key establishment in every sessionmust be secure against malicious
intruders even if those attackers collect transmission packets.
7. Perfect forward secrecy : In a two-party path-key establishment, a scheme is said to have
perfect forward secrecy if revealing of the secret key to an intruder cannot help him/her
derive the session keys of past sessions.
8. Key revocation : When the back-end system or the manager node decides to terminate a
sensor utilizing task, or when a sensor is lost, the sensor must not be allowed to make
use of the credential which it stores to connect to networks.
9. Re-keying : By introducing a re-keying mechanism, a manager node can conveniently up-
date a sensor’s credential without the intervention of back-end system for the purpose
of reducing the communication interactions and management burden on that back-end
system.
4. Literature Classifications
There are many researches about the application with key management proposed in the past.
In this chapter, we classify wireless sensor network schemes into different classifications based
on the application scenarios, including: deployment, organization, re-keying, cryptography
and authentication. We then divide each classification into several subclassifications based
on key management and node authentication. WSNs have a vast field of applications, in-
cluding deployment and organization in both military and civilian aspects, from the battle-
field surveillance, environment monitoring, medical sensing, traffic control and so on. Thus,
the adoptions of security countermeasures are important issues and key management mecha-
nisms are the core of the secure communications. Table 1 is showed the literature classification
on secure communication schemes.
4.1 Deployment and Organization of WSNs
Depending on its applications, a sensor deployment manner can be classified in two types:
scattered deployment and deployment in designated area. For scattered deployment, in order
to achieve large scale of deployment, sensor nodes can be deployed via aerial scattering and
the immediate neighboring nodes of any sensor node are unknown in advance. On the other
hand, due to the unattended nature of WSNs, an attacker may launch various security threats
such as node compromised attacks, the damage might be spread from the compromised area
to the entire network. Therefore, many schemes deploy sensors in designated area in order to
minimize and localize its impact to a small region.
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Classification Characteristic Papers
Deployment Scattered deployment (1–3; 7; 9; 14; 15; 18; 33; 36; 37; 41–44)
Designated area (5; 6; 16; 21; 23; 26; 32; 37; 41; 42)
Organization Distributed WSN (1–3; 7; 9; 16; 18; 26; 36; 37; 41–44)
Hierarchical WSN (5; 6; 14; 15; 21; 23; 32; 33; 37; 41; 42)
Re-keying Periodical update (18; 23; 32; 37; 41; 42; 44)
Node revocation/attachment (1; 3; 6; 15; 17; 18; 23; 26; 33; 37; 41–43)
Cryptography Symmetric key (1; 3; 5–7; 14–16; 21; 23; 26; 32; 33; 36; 37; 41; 42; 44)
Asymmetric key (2; 14; 17; 23; 33; 37; 41–43)
Hashing function (3; 7; 15; 17; 18; 23; 32; 35–37; 41; 42; 44)
Authentication Pair-wise authentication (1; 3; 5–7; 15–17; 23; 26; 32; 33; 36; 37; 41–44)
Group-wise authentication (2; 14; 18; 21; 32; 33; 37; 41; 42; 44)
Table 1. The classification of secure communication schemes
In Figure 1, two general organizations for distributed and hierarchical WSNs are illustrated.
A distributed/hierarchical structure of WSN consists of three types of participants, namely,
a powerful back-end data center, manager nodes and sensor nodes. Each manager node is
responsible for collecting and forwarding all sensed data of its managed area to the back-end
data center for further processing from sensor nodes under the area for which it is responsible.
In distributed WSNs, a number of sensors are uniformly distributed into sense field and there
are no specific roles for each deployment sensor node. In hierarchical WSNs, there are two
types of roles for deployment sensors, namely: cluster head and sensor node. Based on geo-
graphical and deployment knowledge, a manager node groups all sensors into multiple log-
ical groups and the grouping function is conducted through the selection of cluster head for
each group. The main objective of cluster heads are acting as aggregation nodes and fusing
the sense data collected from their nearby sensor nodes before routing the resultant data to a
manager node. Therefore, cluster heads are much more computational and communication
ability than normal sensor nodes in hierarchical WSNs.
4.2 Authentication Scenarios
For authentication in WSNs, three types of scenarios for pair-wise and group-wise authenti-
cation are illustrated in Figure 2. For example, in Figure 2(a), a pair-wise authentication is
accomplished between node x and node y. For group-wise authentication, we divided it into
two scenarios: cluster-based authentication and global-based authentication. In Figure 2(b),
a cluster authentication is used by a cluster head and all its neighboring sensor nodes, and it
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Fig. 1. Organization of WSNs
is used for securing clustered broadcast messages. Finally, in Figure 2(c), this is a node au-
thentication verified by the manager node and all sensor nodes in the sense field. A global
authentication is done by the manager node for securing communications that are broadcast
to the entire network and prevent illegal sensor nodes from participating the sensor networks.
Fig. 2. Authentication scenarios
4.3 Cryptographic Approaches
In order to protect privacy and secure communications, participating nodes joined in WSNs
should be authenticated and shared keys should be established between deployed sensors
and their neighboring nodes. For example, in two-party communications, a deployed node
establishes a pair-wise key with each of its neighboring nodes. Similarly, in broadcast com-
munications, a group-wise key should be shared by all nodes in the network. We classify the
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security of node authentication and key establishment schemes into three types of cryptogra-
phy: symmetric keys, asymmetric keys and one-way hashing functions.
4.3.1 Symmetric Keys
Recently, many schemes (1; 3; 5–7; 14–16; 21; 23; 26; 32; 33; 36; 37; 41; 42; 44) were proposed
to secure communications in WSNs and one of secure communication schemes is based on
symmetric key cryptography. A simple solution to ensure privacy would be store a single
master key MK into all deployed sensors prior to their deployment. Thus, a legal node NA
can use this master key to establish a pair-wise key K = F(MK||NA||NB)with its neighboring
node NB for securing communications that require privacy or node authentication, where F is
a pseudo-random function. However, this solution fails to prevent security breaches and thus
is impracticable for WSNs for whose sensors lack tamper resistance and are easy for attackers
to compromise, leaving all the secret in those networks known to attackers. As a result, during
initial deployment phase, we suggest that there should be a security mechanism for erasing
master key. For example, the manager node sets a timer with reasonable time interval T for
a deployed sensor to discover its neighboring nodes. When a timer expires after T, deployed
sensor node erases MK and attackers cannot inject illegal sensed data into networks without
knowing MK.
The other extreme solution is to store a set of n− 1 key pairs in each sensor node before de-
ployment in such a way that it shares a unique key pair with all other nodes in the networks,
where n is the number of sensor nodes in WSNs. However, this solution is only suitable for
small networks due to it requires large memory to store keys and becomes a serious problem
when the network needs to be expanded. Therefore, many probabilistic key pre-deployed
schemes were proposed to overcome these shortages. A large pool of P keys and their identi-
fiers are generated and d distinct keys are randomly drawn from P and pre-loaded into each
sensor’s key ring, where P ≫ d. This solution ensures that only a few keys need to be stored
in each sensor’s memory and two nodes share at least one key, based on a selected probability.
An extension to the basic probabilistic scheme is proposed by Liu andNing, called polynomial
pool-based key pre-distribution scheme (26). This scheme randomly selects polynomials from
a polynomial pool and stores them to each sensor instead of randomly choosing keys from a
key pool. A detailed survey on symmetric keying schemes could be found in (37; 41; 42)
4.3.2 Asymmetric Keys
As sensors have constrained resources and are expensive to install, computational and com-
munication overhead must be kept at a minimum. Hence the traditional asymmetric cryp-
tosystems such as RSA (34) and ElGamal (10) are not suitable to use in WSNs and most key
management and establishment schemes for WSNs are based upon symmetric key cryptogra-
phy. However, many security solutions based on symmetric keys are usually subject to vari-
ous attacks and they are unable to achieve sufficient scalability (2). On the contrary, asymmet-
ric key cryptography provide better scalability and security strength and allow for flexible key
management as it does not require pre-distribution of keys. Therefore, several solutions based
on asymmetric key algorithms have been proposed in the literature (2; 14; 17; 23; 33; 37; 41–43).
Gura et al. (12) showed that both RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) (20) public key
cryptography (PKC) is applicable on two 8-bit CPUs without hardware acceleration and ECC
is widely being adopted to provide PKC support so that the existing PKC-based solutions can
be exploited. TinyECC(27), a software package, is being investigated to provide ECC-based
PKC operations that can be flexibly configured and integrated into limited-resource sensor
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Fig. 3. Key exchange of a agreed pair-wise key under Diffie-Hellman based on ECDLP
devices. Targeted at security of TinyECC, it provides PKC-based schemes that have proven
to be secure; ECC-160 and ECC-224 have the same security level as RSA-1024 and RSA-2048,
respectively. Moreover, at the beginning of the node deployment, two nodes establish the
permanent pair-wise key using a computationally less expensive variant of the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange scheme (8) based on the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)
(11; 28), as shown in Figure 3. Each node is pre-loaded with private/public key pair and
only two rounds of handshake are required. Private keys are denoted as kx and ky for node
x and node y, respectively as well as the public keys PKx = kx · G and PKy = ky · G. After
receiving neighboring node’s public key, each node will compute agreed pair-wise key as
SKxy = PKy · kx = kx · ky · G = PKx · ky = SKyx.
In 2007, Zhou et al. design an access control scheme (43) based on ECC for sensor networks
and their scheme accomplishes node authentication and key establishment to prevent mali-
cious nodes from joining sensor networks. In 2009, Huang proposed an improved version
(17) of Zhou et al.’s scheme to reduce large amounts of computations and communications
between two nodes. In (14), Hsieh et al. proposed a dynamic authentication protocol to au-
thentication a new node-joining sensor network, establishment of secure links and broadcast
authentication between neighboring nodes in cluster-based sensor networks. In (2), Cao et al.
proposed an ID-based multi-user broadcast authentication scheme based on ECC for provid-
ing strong security, sound scalability and performance efficiency simultaneously.
4.3.3 One-way Hashing Functions
One-way hashing functions (such as MD5 and SHA-1) are important tools in the field of cryp-
tographic applications due to their efficiency with regard to computational costs and are suit-
able for resource-constrained devices. In general, the security of an one-way hashing function
h(.) is based on the hardness of inverting the inputs from the outputs; that is, given a and h(.),
it is easy to compute h(a) = b. However, only given b, it is hard to find a, satisfying h(a) = b.
Figure 4 shows the construction of an one-way hash chain. Participating nodes generate an
initial value h1(k) = h(k), where k is the initial key and h1(k) represents the initial key k has
been hashed once. Thus, hn can be regarded as the key k which has been hashed n times such
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Generate
✲
h1 = h(k) ✲
h(h1)
h2 ✲
h(h2)
. . . hn−1
h(hn−1)
✲ hn
✛
Use
Fig. 4. Construction of an one-way hash chain
that hn(k) = h(hn−1(k)), where n = 2, 3, 4, . . .. Due to the one-way property, the hash chain
can be used in reverse order of generation for authentication; that is, hn−1(k) can be proven
to be authentic if hn(k) has been proven to be authentic. For example, we assume that the
lifetime of a sensor network is divided into n intervals and each time interval Tm has its own
master key Km = h(Km−1), where 1 ≤ m ≤ n, K1 = h(k) and k is an initial key. Figure 5
illustrates the mapping between master keys and time intervals.
Fig. 5. The mapping between master keys and time intervals by using one-way hash chain
In addition, the Message Authentication Code (MAC) which is generated by node x and it
would be verified by node y and is defined by MAC = h(k;m), where m denotes the message
under the protection key of k. Several solutions based on one-way hashing functions have
been proposed in the literature (3; 7; 15; 17; 18; 23; 32; 35–37; 41; 42; 44). In (35), Shan and Liu
proposed the hashed random key pre-distribution, if nodes x and y are deployed in WSNs,
respectively, with Kx = ha(k) and Ky = hb(k), then node y can easily derive Kx = ha−b(Ky),
where k is randomly selected from the key pool and a > b. In Li et al.’s scheme (23), the
concepts of MAC and one-way hash chain are widely be used to authenticate the validity of
transmission messages and participating nodes.
5. Conclusions and Future Works
We argue that no single security scheme is ideal to all the applications where sensor networks
are used and the cryptographic techniques adopted must depend upon the scenarios of ap-
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plied architectures and concerns of security requirements in WSNs. There are some future
research issues should be considered for wireless sensor networks in this chapter. There are
also the critical success factors of wireless sensor networks. We briefly describe them as fol-
lows.
• Soft message encryption: In order to achieve performance efficiency and reduce re-
source requirements, a soft message encryption mechanism is used in which a message
is divided into different parts and each part of the message is involved in encrypting
the whole message itself. This technique has less strength than the sophisticated
encryption algorithms. However, it eliminates the need of key distribution centers and
key establishment (29). For soft message encryption (13), we assume that a 3m-bits
message is divided into three parts of m bits each and we define these parts by x, y and
z. Then, parts x, y and z are encrypted by the following conditions:
x′ = x ⊕ z
y′ = y ⊕ x
z′ = z ⊕ x ⊕ y
Now, the parts x′, y′ and z′ are now transmitted instead of x, y and z. Finally, at the
back-end data center, themessage parts can be decrypted using the following equations:
x = x′ ⊕ y′ ⊕ z′
y = x′ ⊕ z′
z = y′ ⊕ z′
• Multiple communication paths: For pair-wise key establishment in single communica-
tion path, it is vulnerable to stop forwarding attack if an intermediate node is compro-
mised along the path. Moreover, it cannot prevent Byzantine attacks that attackers may
use the compromised nodes to alter, inject, spoof, or sniff messages. A secret key may
be exposed if any intermediate node along the path is compromised and a secret key
established between the source node and destination node by multiple communication
paths can decrease the risk of path key exposure problem. Therefore, multi-path key es-
tablishment solutions are resilient to resist stop forwarding, ensure network availability
from connective failure and prevent compromised sensors from knowing the secret in
WSNs (30; 36; 38). In Figure 6, we use the above-mentioned soft encryption with multi-
ple communication paths as an example.
• Efficient data aggregation: The main objective of data aggregation technique is to com-
bine the sensed data receiving from deployed sensor nodes at certain cluster heads to
minimize the total amount of data transmission before forwarding sensed data to the
external manager node. An efficient and secure data aggregation is essential for cluster-
based WSNs in which data aggregation is eliminating data redundancy to reduce en-
ergy consumption to extend the network lifetime (4; 19; 31; 39; 40). An example of
data aggregation is presented in Figure 7 where a group of data aggregators collect the
data from their neighboring nodes, aggregate them and send the aggregated data to the
manager node.
• Malicious node detection: In order to ensure a secure networking, it should design a
security mechanism to detect malicious nodes and false messages by legitimate nodes
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Fig. 6. An example of multiple communication paths
Fig. 7. Data aggregation in cluster-based wireless sensor networks
and the basic idea of detection of malicious behavior node is to provide a hop-by-hop
authentication in WSNs.
• Node revocation-awareness: Unlike the addition of a sensor node to WSNs, the revo-
cation of a node is much more complicated. When a sensor node is compromised or it
exhausts its power, it must not be allowed to make use of the key information stored
in local memory to connect to the sensor networks and it requires many keys to be re-
voked. As a result, it is important to design a node revocation-awareness mechanism
without bring serious impacts on the network efficiency and connectivity.
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